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We report a simple, but useful, necessary and sufficient condltlon for a pau 
of strategies and/or controls to be semlpermeable. The concept of threshold 
pomt is mtroduced. A lmear dependence condltlon on threshold points 
enables one to decompose the playing space into several subregions so that a 
given pair of strategies is semzpermeable m some regions and is not semi- 
permeable m the others. A simple example 1s used to Illustrate the results. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Semipermeable surfaces play a very important role in two person zero sum 
differential games. This concept was first introduced and studied extensively 
by Isaacs [I]. Some further studies on this concept can be found in 
Leitman [2], Leitmann and Mon [3], Blaquiere, Gerard and Leitmann [4], 
Yu [5-81, and Bradley [9]. It has been shown that the isovalued surfaces in 
terminal payoff games must be semipermeable under some regularity con- 
ditions [2-4, 81. It has also been shown that a transition surface can occur 
only when the isovalued surface cannot have a smooth semipermeable 
extension in the forward sense [8]. In order to study semipermeable surfaces, 
the concept of semipermeable direction (to be restated in Section 2) was intro- 
duced by Yu [5-81. He showed that each pair of optimal strategies must form 
a semipermeable direction. This yields a geometric interpretation of Isaacs’ 
main equation [ 11. Some relationships between semipermeable directions and 
semipermeable surfaces, and between semipermeable directions and optimality 
* Currently vlsltmg af Department of General Business, Utuversity of Texas at 
Austin, Austin, TX 78712. 
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were reported in [8,9]. The ability to determine the region m which a given 
pair of strategies form a semipermeable direction plays a vital role in locating 
singular surfaces and solving the games. 
In this note we focus on linear differential games and, in Section 2, report a 
necessary and sufficient condition for a semipermeable direction. In Section 3 
we introduce the concept of thresholdpoznt and show how we use rt to decom- 
pose the playmg space into several subregions so that a given pair of strategies 
1s semipermeable in some subregions and is not semipermeable in the others. 
Fmally, in Section 4 we supply a simple example to show how we can solve 
the game by the results mentioned. 
2. SEMIPERMEABLE DIRECTIONS 
In this note we shall focus on the following class of hnear differential games. 
(i) The playmg space is EC R”+l, with state variable s = (x,,, xl ,... x,). 
(ii) The terminal surface is V? C aE, where %E is the boundary of E. 
(iii) The payoff is H(X) defined over %. 
(IV) The dynamic system (in the forward sense) 
“T = A(x) + 5 B”(x)@ + i C+!) #‘, 
1-l ,=l 
(1) 
where each @ and z+@ is contained in the interval [- I, 11, d and each B”, CT” 
are contmuous over E. The +-player, who controls + = (#J,..., 4”‘) tries to 
mmimize the payoff; while his opponent, the #-player who controls 
4 = (QP,..., I,!+) tries to maximize it. For convemence, we also write (1) as 
where B = [B’,..., B”‘], C = [Cl ,..., Cl]. #J and # are column vectors in the 
obvious way. We shall use p and Y to indicate a strategy under the 
command of the $-player and $-player, respectively. Thus p and v are func- 
tions from E to @ = [-I, 11” and !P = [- 1, I]‘, respectively. 
DEFINITION 2.1. Given a nonzero vector h m Rn+l, we say that (+,, , #,,) 
E(@ x Y) is semipermeable with respect to h at x if and only if the followmg 
two inequalities hold for all 4 E Cp and I/ E Y 
and 
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We say that (+a , I&) is semipermeable if and only if it is semipermeable with 
respect to some h # 0. 
DEFINITION 2.2. Given a nonzero continuous functron h(x) over a region 
R C E, a pair of strategies (p(x), Y x ( )) is said to be semipermeable with respect 
to h(x) over R if and only if at each point x of R, (p(x), V(X)) is semipermeable 
with respect to h(x). 
THEOREM 2.1. (do , I,$) is semipermeable with respect o X # 0 at x tf and 
only if 
(1) A . (A(x) + B(x) $0 + C(x) ho) = 0, 
(ii) 4s” = -sgn[A * B*(x)] if h . B’(x) # 0, 
(iii) $0’ = sgn[A * C?(x)] if h . C(x) # 0, 
where 
Proof. 
sgn(a) == -1 if 
i 
1 if a>0 
a<0 
0 otherwise. 
For necessity. The equality (1) follows immediately from Definition 
2.1. In order to establish (ii), suppose that $,-,* # -sgn[A * B]. Let & be 
such that 4,” = 4s” if k # i and &z = -sgn[h . B’]. Then, 
h . (A + B4, + C$&) = A . (A + B$o + C$&) + A . (By,“) - A * (By) < 0 
(because h . (A + &So + C$,) = 0 and &E uniquely minimizes h * BP for 
all 4’ E [- 1, l]}. This contradicts (3). The proof of (iii) is similar to that of (ii). 
For su$iciency. Observe that 
{because h . (A + B&, + C#,,) = 0, and d,, minimizes h . B+ for all 4 E @p). 
This establishes (3). The inequality (4) can be established similarly. 
COROLLARY 2.1. Let (&, , #I~) be semipermeable with respect to X # 0. 
Suppose that for each i and j, h . BZ # 0 and h - 0 # 0. Then (+,, , q&b) is the 
unique pair of senupermeable controls with respect o A. Otherwise, there are an 
infkite number of pairs of controls which are semipermeable with respect to A. 
COROLLARY 2.2. Let (p,,, q,) be semipermeable with respect o a continuous 
function A(x) # 0 over R. Suppose that h(x) - B*(x) # 0 for each i. Then t~, is 
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a constant strategy (- 1 or 1) over R. Similarly, ;f X(x) . C’(x) # 0 for each j, 
then v,, is a constant strategy (- 1 or 1) over R. 
3. THRESHOLD POINTS 
In this section we shall study conditions which can enable one to decompose 
the playing space into subregions in which the semipermeabihty of a pair of 
strategies can be easily investigated. 
DEFINITION 3.1. Given a continuous function X(X), a pomt so of E IS d 
threshold point with respect to X(x) for a pair of continuous strategzes 
(p(x), v(x)) if for any neighborhood N(x,) there exists x1 and x, of N(.v,) so 
that with respect to X(x), (p, v) is semipermeable at .‘cr , and not at .vp . 
As a consequence of the continuity assumption and Theorem 2.1 or 
Corollary 2.2, we have the following. 
THEOREM 3.1. =;2 pair of continuous strategies can have x0 E: E as a threshold 
point with respect to a continuous function X(s) only ifat least one of the following 
m + 1 equalities holds: 
X(x,) . @(x0) = 0, i = l,..., m, 
X(x()) . C’(X”) = 0, j = l,..., 1. 
Remark 3.1. Suppose that V(x), the value of the game, has continuous 
derivatives in a region R of E. By setting X(x) = V”(X), (CT’ is the gradient 
of IT), we see from Corollary 2.2 that if each VI;(x) * E(X) and V l’(x) . C’(s) 
are nonzero over R, then Theorem 3.1 states under such circumstances, no 
point of R can be a threshold point with respect to VV(x) for any pair of 
continuous strategies. Observe that VP’(x) . B”(x) and CV(x) . C?(x) are 
known as switching functions. If we know that VP’ is continuous, then the 
vanishing of one of such switching functions will yield a necessary condition 
for the discontinutty of the optimal strategies. Unfortunately, in most non- 
trivial games V 1’ is not continuous. Thus Theorem 3.1 cannot m general be 
used to locate singular surfaces and solve the game. 
DEFINITION 3.2. A pomt x,, of E is a threshold point for a pair of controls 
(4s , I,&) if and only if for any neighborhood N(x,) there exists ?cr and x2 
of N(x,) so that (4s , &) is semipermeable at ?cr , and not at s, . 
Remark 3.2. Note1 that if m + 1 < n, every pair (4, 4) of controls form a 
1 By takmg X to be a nonzero element in the orthogonal complement of the hnear 
subspace spanned by (B’} and {Cl). 
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semipermeable direction for some /I + 0. In many dtfferential games, however, 
m + 1 > n and in such cases, it may be of value to know precisely where a 
particular pair of controls form a semipermeable direction and where they 
do not. The following results enable one to determine this. 
THEOREM 3.2. If x0 is a threshold point for (#,, , &), then 
(I) (4, , &) are semipermeable at x,, wtth respect o some A # 0. 
(Ii) With respect o such A, at least one of h . B(x,) = 0, h . 0(x,,) = 0, 
2 = I,... , m, j = 1,. . ., 1 holds. 
Proof. (u) follows immediately from (i) and Theorem 3.1, by treating 
($a, +,,) and h as constants. We prove (i) as follows. By hypothesis, there 
exists {xk} in E, xk. + x,, , and {hp}, I/ AI; (/ = 1, so that (&, , I,$) are semi- 
permeable at each x,, with respect to &. (11 )Imeans Euclidean Norm.) Since 
{A E R”+l 1 I/ h // == 1) . is compact, there is a subsequence {hB1} of {h,} so that 
(h,J -+ A, f 0. Also (r,z} + x0 . By continuity of A(x), B(x) and C(X), it is 
seen that (3) and (4) of Definition 2.1 hold for h, and (4s , I+$,) at x,, . 
Q.E.D. 
THEOREM 3.3. Suppose that x0 is a threshold point for (4,) &) and that 
&” (OY z&) is not extreme (i.e., / $02 1 # 1). Dejine ++ ‘and +- such that 
++” =&,” =+-” ifk # i, and4 +E = 1, +-’ = - 1. (Similarly #+ and #- are 
dejined.) Then x,, is also a thresholdpoznt for either (4, , #,,) OY ($- , &,) (or for 
esm- (~4, > #+I 0~ (A, 3 4-N. 
Proof. In view of Theorem 2.1, we see that if ($0 , &) is semipermeable 
at xi , then both (4, , #,J and (4- , #,,) are semipermeable at m, . Thus it 
suffices to show that in each neighborhood of x0 , there exists xa so that 
(#+ , &,) or (+- , I,$) are not semipermeable. Assuming the contrary, then both 
($+ , I&,) (+- , I,&) are semipermeable at each point of a neighborhood N(x,J. 
Then from Theorem 2.1, we see that (& , &,) must be semipermeable at each 
point of N(x,,). However, this contradicts that x,, is a threshold point for 
&I 9 *lJ Q.E.D. 
THEOREM 3.4. Suppose x,, is a threshold point for ($,, , $,,). Then there 
exists {il ,..., i,}C{l,..., m} and {j, ,..., j,}C{l,..., Z} such that p+q ==n 
and 
W(%) + wow0 + C(%>!4J, w%),..., ~E+J), Cq%),..., Cw%)) 
are linearly dependent. 
Proof. By Theorem 3.3, without loss of generality we may assume that 
each 4s” and I,&? is extreme. 
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The theorem holds trivially if 
4X0) + B(xo) $0 + C(xo) $0 
or one of B”(x,) or 0(x,,) is zero. Thus we need consider only the case that 
each of them is nonzero. Define 
i 
4x0) + B(xo) 40 + C(xo) 40 9 2 =o, 
D” = -B*(x,)cj$, 
1 
1 <i<m, (5) 
c-(X0) l/P-“, m+l~i~mfZ. 
From the above remarks, we see that each Da # 0, i > 0. In view of Theo- 
rem 2.1, we see that (&, , #,,) is semipermeable with respect to X at x0 if and 
only if X . D” == 0 and X . DL > 0, i = I,..., r/l + 1 Now suppose that we 
have selected a set I = (0, i, ,..., iii} and h # 0 such that (9, , 4”) is semi- 
permeable with respect to h and if i E I, then h . Dz = 0; otherwise, X . Dz > 0. 
By Theorem 3.2, I f {0}, thus k 3 1. We consider two possible cases. 
Case 1. k 3 n. Observe that if h is normal to a Dz, i ;> 1, then it IS 
also normal to the corresponding B* or C - ZnZ. Thus Do and any n of the D”, 
iE1 (and their associates Bt (or C-m)) are linearly dependent (because 
X # 0 and X E P+l) and our assertion holds. 
Case 2. k < n. We show that {D* 1 i ~1) must be hnearly dependent. 
Assume the contrary. Let 02 be the projection of Dar onto the orthogonal 
complement in Rn+l of the subspace spanned by {Dz / i # k, i E I>. Since 
{D” / i E I) are linearly independent, D: # 0. By continuity of Dz, we know 
that there is a neighborhood N(h) of X such that for each v E A’(X), v . Dk > 0 
for all i ~1. Therefore for olZl > 0 sufficiently small, h’ = X + +D’h is a 
member of IV(X), and 
A’ - Dz = 0, i#i, and iEI, 
A’ - DE > 0 otherwise. 
Let I’ = (0, i, ,..., i,-, }. We thus have constructed a X’ # 0 so that (4, , Z&J 
are semipermeable with respect to X’ and 
A’ . D = 0, i E I’, 
A’ - DE > 0, i $ I’. 
Applying identically the same process as above to x’ and I’ k - 1 times, we 
can generate h, # 0 so that with respect to X, , (Co, #o) are semipermeable 
and A0 . Di > 0 for all i > 1, a contradiction to (ii) of Theorem 3.2. Thus 
{D’ 1 i ~1) is linearly dependent and our assertion holds for this case too. 
Q.E.D. 
409/48/3-16 
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Remark 3.3. Let M(x) denote a (rz + 1) x (n + 1) matrix whose first 
column is DO(x) ; others are selected from {D*(X) 1 i = I,..., m + Z} where 
D”(x) = 
1 
44 + w 40 + cc4 #o , i = 0, 
B”(x), 1 <i<m, (6) 
C-(x), m+l<i<m+l. 
Then {x 1 det M(X) = 0} will be a candidate for a set of threshold points for 
(+. , $o). By considering all such matrices, we can locate all threshold points 
and decompose the playing space into several subregions such that ($. , #o) 
is either semipermeable or not so throughout each subregion. This informa- 
tion will be important in solving differential games as will be illustrated in the 
example of the next section. 
Remark 3.4. Theorem 3.3 states that if we can locate all threshold points 
for all extreme controls we locate all threshold points for all pairs of controls. 
Also observe that in Theorem 3.4, except 
D”(x) = A(x) + B(x) $0 + C(x) $0 , 
all the vectors involved are independent of the choice of (40, #o). This fact 
together with the special structures of matrices (M(x)} allow us to speed up 
the computation for the set of all threshold points for all pairs of controls. 
4. AN EXAMPLE 
Let us consider the following differential game studied in [7]: 
(i) The playing space is E = {(x, y) 1 y > 1.5). 
(ii) The terminal surface is S? = {(x, y) 1 y = 1.5). 
(iii) The dynamic system is 
R = 10 + 64 - 5y#, 
3 = -8 + 124 + 4y#. 
(iv) The payoff is H = - x on V. If the game does not terminate it is 
arbitrarily large. 
Observe that A = (10, -8)‘, B = (6, 12)’ and C = (-5y, 4~)‘. We first 
locate all candidates of threshold points in E. From elementary matrix 
theory, we know that 
det[A + B + C, C] = det[A + B - C, C] = det[A + B, C]. 
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Thus in checking the candidates for threshold points, it suffices to find the 
zero sets of the determinants of [A + B, C], [A - B, C], [-4 + C, B] and 
[d - C, B]. (See Remark 3.3-3.4.) We find that the line y = 2 is the only 
candidate in IL (Note that the line y = 2 is the zero set of the determinant of 
[-4 + C, B].) A sample verification (see Figs. 1-3) shows that the points on the 
line y = 2 indeed are threshold points for strategies (4, 4) = (1 - 1) and 
( -1, 1). In fact it can easily be shown that the lure is a double transition 
surface for the game (i.e., both players have discontinuities in their optimal 
strategies). (See [7].) 
I A+B+C 
A-B 
A-B-C 
FIG. 1. Vectogram on Y = 3. 
A+B+C 
A-B+C 
A-B-C 
3 
A+B+C 
+B 
A-B 
A-B-C 
A+B-C 
FIG. 2. Vectogram on Y = 2. FIG. 3. Vectogram on Y = 1.5. 
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The Figs. 1-3 indicate the possible values for (k, j); the arrows indicate the 
extreme vectors. Note the linear dependence of the vectors A + B + C 
and A - B + C at the double transition surface. 
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